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Outlet / Organization:

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Please see below in respons	se to FOIA Action 105847.	•	•	
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Thanks Tina		•••	:	
Tina Hanna-Frederick		•••	•	
Chief, NSA/CSS Public A	ffairs Office	••.	<u>:</u>	
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MediaRelations@nsa.gov				
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From: Augustine, Christoph				
Sent: Thursday, February 7,				
To: m.brice@thomsonreute				
Cc: MediaRelations <mediarelations@nsa.gov></mediarelations@nsa.gov>				
Subject: RE: Message from Submit a Media Query Form				
Makini,				
Thanks for your query. We have nothing for you on this.				
Chris Augustine NSA Media Relations				
NSA Media Relations				
From: donotreply@nsa.gov				
Sent: 2/7/2019 18:36				
To: MediaRelations				
Subject: Message from Submit a Media Query Form				
			elease b; NSA on 06-26-2019,	
Name:	Makini Brice	FOIA Case # 10	(5847 (litigation)	
Phone Number	2025588211			

1 NSA FOIA Case 105847 Page 0001

m brice \hat{a} thomson reuters.com

Reuters

Doc ID: 6671747

Hello -- I am writing regarding a New York Times report that was published

this evening that said American intelligence agencies intercepted a

conversation between the Saudi crown prince and an aide, in which MBS said Message:

he would use "a bullet" on journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Are you able to

confirm the report and/or do you have any comment on it?

Deadline / Due Date (Format: 2/7/2019

MM/DD/YYYY):

From:	• MediaRelations	
Sent:	Friday, April 26, 2019 11:08 AM	
To:	· ·	
Cc:	•	
Subject:	FW: [Non-DoD Source] Saudi	
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PLEASE DO NOT REPLY ALL	but directly to ME if there are any issues.	:
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Tina Hanna-Frederick	•••	• •
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	(5)) (3)-P.L. 86-36
From: Augustine, Christoph	nerJ	

Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2018 1:08 PM To: MediaRelations < MediaRelations@nsa.gov>

Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Saudi

Logged

From: Augustine, Christopher J

Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2018 1:05 PM

To: 'Evans, Michael' <michael.evans@the-times.co.uk>; MediaRelations <MediaRelations@nsa.gov>

Cc: 'KELLIELW' <Kellie.Wade@dni.gov>; dni-pao@dni.gov

Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Saudi

Mike.

Thank you for reaching out. We are referring all media queries on this topic to the ODNI media relations team. I have cc'd Kellie Wade Media Relations Officer from ODNI, and the ODNI media relations team, to help you. Good luck.

V/R

Approved for Release by NSA on 06-26-2019, FOIA Case # 105847 (litigation)

Augie

Chris Augustine	
Media Relations Officer	
National Security Agency (NSA)	
	(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
Media Line: 443-634-0721	

From: Evans, Michael < michael.evans@the-times.co.uk>

Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2018 12:59 PM
To: MediaRelations < MediaRelations@nsa.gov>

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Saudi

Hi

I gather Tommy is no longer on the media relations desk. Can I therefore ask you, is there any way you can guide me without any attribution as to whether the US government has acquired through its own means the Turkish video/audio tapes of the suspected killing of Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul? Any guidance would be much appreciated.

Best
Mike Evans
The Times of London
(Pentagon Correspondent in DC 2010-2013)

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Soule Trumbull D NSA-P3 USA CIV

From: Julian Gregory S NSA-P212 USA CIV

Sent: Tuesday, February 12, 2019 8:27 AM
To: Nakasone Paul M GEN NSA-D USA USA

Cc: Barnes George C NSA-D USA CIV; Coker Harry Jr USA CIV; Soule Trumbull D NSA-P3

USA CIV: Couvillion Kelli M NSA-P2 USA CIV

Subject: (U) Media Awareness: NY Times story

Categories: READ This

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Sir.

BLUF: The following article is follow-up Worldwide Threat Assessment media coverage highlighting the challenge of testifying publicly.

BACKGROUND: This story was not in our morning news clips but was published overnight and we though you should see it before your next appearance on the Hill.

STATUS: For awareness only, Media Relations has not received any queries on this topic.

When the President and his Intelligence Chiefs Clash

David Sanger

NY Times, February 12, 2019

For the team of national security correspondents who sit along the west side of The New York Times's Washington bureau, there is almost nothing more revealing -- or, in the Trump era, more politically charged -- than an annual exercise mandated by Congress called the "Worldwide Threat Assessment." It is the one moment each year that the chief's of America's biggest intelligence agencies -- the Central Intelligence Agency, the F.B.I. and the National Security Agency, along with lesser-known but giant agencies that defend American troops or run spy satellites -- are required to explain what worries them, and to rank the threats facing the country.

In a public, declassified way, they have to summarize their judgments about whether the North Koreans will ever give up their arsenal, whether the Iranians are violating a nuclear deal that the United States has already renounced, and how much progress is being made defeating terror groups like the Islamic State.

That task has never been a straightforward one -- especially when an intelligence finding complicates, or undermines, a president's desired outcomes. President Barack Obama's director of national intelligence, James R. Clapper Jr., usually opened his testimony by complaining that he had to deliver those assessments in public - naturally secretive, the intelligence leaders prefer to talk to Congress behind closed doors.

But in the Trimp era, the task is infinitely more complicated: The intelligence chiefs know that every word they inter will be judged in the Oval Office by whether the independent, fact-based judgments of the roughly \$80 billion intelligence enterprise promote or undercut Mr. Trump's instincts and policies.

Approved for Release by NSA on 06-26-2019, FOIA Case # 105847 (litigation)

So as my colleague Julian Barnes and I prepared for this year's testimony, I remembered the comment that the head of one of the agencies made to me during a holiday party in December. "My objective for the year." this official said, half-jokingly, "is to stay out of the president's Twitter feed."

No such luck. A day after the testimony at the very end of January — and only after he had read the coverage that contrasted with his own descriptions of those problems — the president crupted. "The Intelligence people seem to be extremely passive and naive when it comes to the dangers of Iran," he tweeted, reacting to their conclusion that the mullahs in Iran, are, for now, abiding by the 2015 agreement and are not producing new nuclear fuel for weapons.

He did not care for the assessment that Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader Mr. Trump will meet in Vietnam this month, will not give up all of his nuclear weapons, no matter what the president wants to believe. "Perhaps Intelligence should go back to school," Mr. Trump tweeted. Then he summoned several of the chiefs to the White House and got them to agree, at least publicly, that the problem was not their conclusions, it was us — the biased journalists covering the open, public testimony. The testimony, he wrote, was "mischaracterized by the media," and he assured everyone "we are very much in agreement on Iran, ISIS. North Korea, etc."

They are not, obviously -- just read the public document. But the moment crystallized one of the biggest challenges in covering national security issues in Washington these days: There's what the government believes and what the president wants to believe. And when you compare the two, you are charged with taking sides, or inciting disagreements, in an effort to tear down Mr. Trump or weaken America in front of its adversaries.

In the days running up to Mr. Trump's State of the Union address, more than one member of the administration accused me, my colleagues and The Times of deliberately highlighting those differences in an effort to provoke just the kind of reaction Mr. Trump had the morning after the testimony. Why don't you just write it straight, one asked? Just say what the intelligence chiefs said, and not try to compare it to the president's statements?

The answer is simple: We're not stenographers. Our readers expect us to use decades of experience, as foreign correspondents around the world and as reporters who have delved into unclassified and classified data for years, to provide context into what an intelligence report on some of the most complex problems in the world really means. And we must assess the question of whether the president is integrating, ignoring or rejecting the conclusions of the intelligence community before he makes decisions.

As Mr. Trump likes to point out, intelligence agencies are not infallible -- see "Iraq, nuclear weapons." But the core of our job is helping readers understand the difference between facts on the ground, the "assessments" or judgments of the intelligence community, and the policy decisions that result.


So it is news when Mr. Trump decides he is going to deal with the Saudi crown prince, because the relationship with the kingdom outweighs the import of the C.I.A. conclusion, with medium-to-high certainty, that he was deeply involved in the killing of the dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi. (Mr. Trump called the C.I.A.'s view "Icelings" rather than an assessment.) And hiding behind the fact that the C.I.A. conclusion is classified, as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo did when asked about it the other day, does not silence the debate over how the United States should deal with a national leader suspected of being part of a murder conspiracy.

There was another reason to point out the differences: to prepare the country for the stark difference between the picture of the world the intelligence chiefs painted and the one Mr. Trump described last Tuesday night in his State of the Union address.

In Mr. Trump's telling, the flood of illegal immigrants from inguarded stretches of the southwestern border is the No. I threat the United States must address. But drug trafficking, cartels and the issues of the Mexican border do not appear in the report until Page 18, and then comparatively fleetingly.

In the intelligence community's judgment, it is cyber threats -- to our electric grid, our privacy and our election system -- that ranked No. 1, and occupied pages upon pages of the report. The intelligence chiefs, it turned out, are consumed by the long-term issues of the race with China over artificial intelligence and quantum computing, and whether we have enough programming and scientific talent in the pipeline to keep up, much less keep ahead. The issue never came up in the State of the Union address. Nor did the central conclusion of Mr. Trump's own national security strategy: that the chief concern today has to be the renewal of great-power competition between the United States. Russia and China.

Sometimes the news is in the reports, the testimony, the leaked documents. Sometimes, it's in the silences.




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From: Sent:	Friday, February 08, 2019 9:07 AM
To:	riday, rebibary da, 2013 9.07 AM
Subject:	FW: (U) NY Times article regarding MBS communications about Khashoggi released
Attachments:	NYT Year Before Killing, Sandi Prince Told Aide He Would Use a Bullet on
	Khashoggi.docx
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Subject: (O) IAX HILLER 9((icle regarding MBS communications about Khashoggi released

Classification: TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORM

GEN Nakasone,



Subject: (U) Media Awareness NY Times query regarding MBS communications about Khashoggi

Classification: TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN

(b) (6)

Sir,

BLUF: Media Relations received the attached query from Mark Mazzetti, NY Times, regarding communications from Mohammed bin Salman about Khashoggi.

BACKGROUND: This is the first contact from this reporter on this topic. Media Relations has declined to comment and referred any related queries on this topic to ODNI, FBI and CIA. NY Times intends to report on this information today.

STATUS: Media Relations has notified ODNI, FBI, CIA, and DDD Public Affairs and will respond that NSA has nothing for NY Times on this query.

٧R

Ooc ID: 6671829	
Greg	
Greg Julian Media Relations Chief NSA/CSS Public Affairs Strategic Communications (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36	
Media Relations: 443-634-0721 5 959-7499 (secure)	
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New York Times

Year Before Killing, Saudi Prince Told Aide He Would Use 'a Bullet' on Khashoggi



Intercepted conversations revealed evidence that the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, considered killing Jamal Khashoggi long before his death in Istanbul.CreditCreditSergio Moraes/Reuters

By Mark Mazzetti

Feb. 7, 2019

WASHINGTON — Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia told a top aide in a conversation in 2017 that he would use "a bullet" on Jamal Khashoggi, the journalist killed in October, if Mr. Khashoggi did not return to the kingdom and end his criticism of the Saudi government, according to current and former American and foreign officials with direct knowledge of intelligence reports.

The conversation, intercepted by American intelligence agencies, is the most detailed evidence to date that the crown prince considered killing Mr. Khashoggi long before a team of Saudi operatives strangled him inside the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul and dismembered his body using a bone saw. Mr. Khashoggi's murder prompted weeks of outrage around the world and among both parties in Washington, where senior lawmakers called for an investigation into who was responsible.

The Saudi government has denied that the young crown prince played any role in the killing, and President Trump has publicly shown little interest in trying get the facts about who was responsible. Prince Mohammed, the next in line to the Saudi throne behind his ailing father, King Salman, has become the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia and a close ally of the Trump White House — especially Jared Kushner, the president's son-in-law and senior adviser.

The conversation appears to have been recently transcribed and analyzed as part of an effort by intelligence agencies to find proof of who was responsible for Mr. Khashoggi's death. The National Security Agency and other American spy agencies are now sifting through years of the crown prince's voice and text communications that the N.S.A. routinely intercepted and stored, much as the agency has long done for other top foreign officials, including close allies of the United States.

For the past several months, the National Security Agency has circulated intelligence reports to other spy agencies, the White House and close foreign allies about the crown prince's communications. The reports were described by several current and former officials. Weeks after the killing, the C.I.A. finished its first assessment about the operation, concluding that Prince Mohammed had ordered it.

The conversation between Prince Mohammed and the aide, Turki Aldakhil, took place in September 2017, as officials in the kingdom were growing increasingly alarmed about Mr. Khashoggi's criticisms of the Saudi government. That same month, Mr. Khashoggi began writing opinion columns for The Washington Post, and top Saudi officials discussed ways to lure him back to Saudi Arabia.

In the conversation, Prince Mohammed said that if Mr. Khashoggi could not be enticed back to Saudi Arabia, then he should be returned by force. If neither of those methods worked, the crown prince said, then he would go after Mr. Khashoggi "with a bullet," according to the officials familiar with one of the intelligence reports, which was produced in early December.

American intelligence analysts concluded that Prince Mohammed might not have meant the phrase literally — in other words, he did not necessarily mean to have Mr. Khashoggi shot — but more likely he used the phrase as a metaphor to emphasize that he had every intention of killing the journalist if he did not return to Saudi Arabia.

An autopsy expert. A lookalike. A black van. Our video investigation follows the movements of the 15-man Saudi hit team that killed and dismembered the journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

At the time of the conversation with Mr. Aldakhil, Prince Mohammed was in the midst of consolidating power in the kingdom. Just months earlier, his father elevated him to second in line to the throne after Prince Mohammed plotted the ouster of his predecessor, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef.

In late 2017, Prince Mohammed ordered hundreds of influential businessmen and Saudi royals — some who had been considered contenders to the throne — locked up at the Ritz Carlton hotel in Riyadh, the Saudi capital, where they were interrogated.

Days before the conversation with Mr. Aldakhil, according to the same intelligence report, Prince Mohammed complained to another aide — Saud al-Qahtani — that Mr. Khashoggi had grown too influential. Prince Mohammed said that Mr. Khashoggi's articles and Twitter posts were tarnishing the crown prince's image as a forward-thinking reformer, and the criticism was more cutting because it was coming from a journalist who had once been seen as supportive of his agenda.

When Mr. al-Qahtani said that any move against Mr. Khashoggi was risky and could create an international uproar, his boss scolded him: Saudi Arabia should not care about international reaction to how it handles its own citizens, the crown prince told Mr. al-Qahtani.

Prince Mohammed also told Mr. al-Qahtani, according to an official who has read the report, that he "did not like half-measures — he never liked them and did not believe in them."

Days after this conversation and the one about the bullet, Mr. Khashoggi wrote his first column for The Washington Post: "Saudi Arabia Wasn't Always This Repressive. Now It's Unbearable." It was a withering attack on Prince Mohammed's crackdown inside the kingdom.

"I have left my home, my family and my job, and I am raising my voice," Mr. Khashoggi wrote. "To do otherwise would betray those who languish in prison. I can speak when so many cannot."

Spokesmen for the National Security Agency and the C.I.A. declined to comment. In a statement, Mr. Aldakhil said, "These allegations are categorically false. They appear to be a continuation of various efforts by different parties to connect His Royal Highness Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to this horrific crime. These efforts will prove futile."

Officials at the Saudi Embassy in Washington, contacted on Thursday morning, had not commented by 6 p.m.



Turki Aldakhil, center, in 2017 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Mr. Aldakhil spoke with the crown prince that September about Mr. Khashoggi, as officials in the kingdom were growing increasingly alarmed about Mr. Khashoggi's criticisms of the Saudi government. Credit Tasneem Alsultan for The New York Times

In December, The Wall Street Journal reported that Prince Mohammed exchanged numerous messages with Mr. al-Qahtani in the hours before and after Mr. Khashoggi's killing, citing the C.I.A.'s assessment of the Saudi operation.

The Journal report did not give details about the messages, and officials have said that American spy agencies in many cases are able to capture only the date and time of messages — so-called metadata — not their content.

The Journal also reported that Prince Mohammed spoke with associates in August 2017 about luring Mr. Khashoggi from the United States to a third country if officials were unable to get him to Saudi Arabia.

American intelligence agencies have identified Mr. al-Qahtani as the ringleader of the operation that killed Mr. Khashoggi, and last year, he was put on a list of Saudi officials sanctioned by the United States for their role in the journalist's death. Mr. al-Qahtani is viewed in the kingdom as a brutal enforcer of the crown prince's agenda and has used an army of online trolls to harass Saudi dissidents on social media.

After Mr. Khashoggi's killing, the kingdom announced that Mr. al-Qahtani had been removed from his position as an adviser to the royal court. Saudi Arabia has since begun criminal proceedings against 11 individuals involved in the operation. Prosecutors are seeking the death penalty for five of them.

The kingdom has not released the names of the people on trial, and it is unclear whether Mr. al-Qahtani is among them.

Mr. Aldakhil, the other aide to the crown prince caught in the intercepts, until recently was the general manager of the Al Arabiya television network in Saudi Arabia. He is an influential media figure in the kingdom and a prominent adviser to the crown prince.

During the September 2017 conversation, according to intelligence reports, Mr. Aldakhil spoke to Prince Mohammed about luring Mr. Khashoggi back to Saudi Arabia with the possibility of a job at Al Arabiya. The crown prince was skeptical that Mr. Khashoggi would accept the offer.

Last month, Mr. Aldakhil left his post at the network. Saudi news sites have reported that he is expected to be named the next Saudi ambassador to the United Arab Emirates.



People holding posters showing Mr. Khashoggi during a symbolic funeral prayer last year in Istanbul CreditHusevin Aldemir/Reuters

American officials said there is no evidence that Mr. Aldakhil had knowledge of a specific plan to capture or kill Mr. Khashoggi, and his name has never been among the suspects in the killing.

In the weeks after Mr. Khashoggi's death, classified evidence piled up that senior Saudi royals approved the Khashoggi operation, even as American officials insisted that there was no "smoking gun" directly tying the crown prince to it. The narrative from the Saudi royal court changed repeatedly, and the Saudi government has been determined to insulate the powerful crown prince from blame.

Most recently, Saudi officials have said that the operation was a kidnapping gone awry — that the team had been sent to Istanbul to forcibly bring Mr. Khashoggi back to Saudi Arabia but made the decision to kill him after he refused to cooperate. Saudi officials have said that Prince Mohammed had no knowledge of the operation.

In the latest indication that the international uproar over Mr. Khashoggi's killing will continue, the United Nations' special rapporteur on extrajudicial executions said on Thursday that she would urge the United Nations and its member states to take further actions "for the purpose of formal criminal accountability" of those responsible.

In a preliminary report to the United Nations human rights commission, the special rapporteur, Agnes Callamard, concluded that extensive evidence indicated that Mr. Khashoggi "was the victim of a brutal and premeditated killing, planned and perpetrated by officials of the State of Saudi Arabia."

Late last year, Mr. Trump tried to blunt the outrage by issuing a statement saying that it was possible that Prince Mohammed ordered the killing, but the facts might never be known.

What was more important, the president indicated, was that the kingdom had pledged hundreds of billions of dollars of investments in the United States, including \$110 billion in arms purchased from Lockheed Martin, Boeing and other defense firms. Defense analysts say that the actual amount that the Saudi government spends is likely to be far lower.

With Democrats now in control of the House of Representatives, lawmakers are hoping for a sustained push for answers about who was behind Mr. Khashoggi's death. The House Foreign Affairs Committee is planning to introduce legislation calling for the director of national intelligence to produce a report to Congress identifying which Saudi officials helped plan the operation, according to two Democratic congressional aides.


In early December, Jim Mattis, then the defense secretary, told reporters, "We are doing everything we can to go down every rabbit hole to find what's there," adding, "We are leaving no stone unturned."

"I am quite satisfied we will find more evidence of what happened," Mr. Mattis said. "I just don't know what it's going to be or who is going to be implicated."

Reporting was contributed by Ben Hubbard from Beirut, Lebanon; Julian E. Barnes and Thomas Gibbons-Neff from Washington; and David D. Kirkpatrick from London.

SOURCE: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/07/us/politics/khashoggi-mohammed-bin-salman.html

Soule Trumbull D NSA-P3 USA CIV



BLUF: Media Relations received the attached query from Mark Mazzetti, NY Times, regarding communications from Mohammed bin Salman about Khashoggi.

BACKGROUND: This is the first contact from this reporter on this topic. Media Relations has declined to comment and referred any related queries on this topic to ODNI, FBI and CIA. NY Times intends to report on this information today.

STATUS: Media Relations has notified ODNI, FBI, CIA, and OOD Public Affairs and will respond that NSA has nothing for NY Times on this query.

VR
Greg

Greg Julian
Media Relations Chief
NSA/CSS Public Affairs
Strategic Communications

Media Relations 443-634-0721 959 7699 (secure)

STRATEGIC C MMUNICATIONS

Doc ID: 6671830



(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Classified By: Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

Dated: 20130930

Declassify On: 20440201

Classification: TOP-SECRET//SI//NOFORM

Julian, Gregory S

From:

Mazzetti, Mark <mazzetti@nytimes.com>

Sent:

Thursday, February 7, 2019 9:48 AM

To:

Julian, Gregory S

Subject:

[Non-DoD Source] Hello/New York Times

Greg-

This is Mark Mazzetti with The New York Times. I hope you are well.

I'm writing because we are preparing a story for today about some updates in the IC assessment on Jamal Khashoggi's death. The NSA has been transcribing more stored conversations of Mohammed bin Salman, and this effort has yielded more evidence that the crown prince intended to kill Khashoggi if he did not return to KSA. Here are some details that we are planning to report:

- 1. In September 2017, MBS has a conversation with Turki Aldakhil, one of his top advisers and the head of Al Arabiya network, saying that if Khashoggi could not be enticed to return to KSA with an Al Arabiya job, he would be taken back forcibly. If that didn't work, MBS said, they would "use a bullet."
- 2. Days earlier, MBS has a conversation with Saad al Qahtani. They discuss how JK has become a big problem for the kingdom. Qahtani says that it could cause international blowback if something was done to JK, and MBS said that Saudi Arabia shouldn't worry about that. There is a direct quote from one of the intel reports I intend to use that says MBS said he "did not like half-measures. He never liked them and did not believe in them."
- 3. The ongoing effort in the IC is to go back several years on MBS's communication to gather more evidence of his role in the operation.

I have not seen the reports myself but have spoken to sources who have.

I thought it was best to lay this all out in an email, but if you want I'm available to chat anytime that's convenient for you.

Best Mark

The New York Times
Work: 202-862-0303

mazzelli@nytimes.com
Book Websile: markmazzelli.net

To: Cc:	DL OGC Media (ALJAS) D2 reness NY Times query regarding MBS communications about
Classification: TOP SECRET//SI//NOF	FORN
Following-up - Greg also received a call from Julian B piece) and asked:	arnes with the NY Times (who is working with Mazzetti on this
 How long does the NSA store information? What is stored (how long), and is it determined and, can we talk about it? 	by classification? (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
V/r, (b) (3) -P. (b) (5) From: Julian Gregory S NSA-P212 USA CIV	L 86-36 (b) (6)
To: Nakasone Paul M GEN NSA-D USA USA Cc: Barnes George C NSA-D USA CIV	Coker Harry Jr USA CIV DL DIRcomms
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DL soo (ALIAS) DL nsoccrsmm (ALIAS) P6 John J NSA-P USA CIV	Mulligan
JUNITY NOAPE ODA CIV	<u> </u>

Subject: (U) Media Awareness NY Times query regarding MBS communications about Khashoggi

Classification: TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN

Sir,

Doc ID: 6671831

BLUF: Media Relations received the attached query from Mark Mazzetti, NY Times, regarding communications from Mohammed bin Salman about Khashoggi.

BACKGROUND: This is the first contact from this reporter on this topic. Media Relations has declined to comment and referred any related queries on this topic to ODNI, FBI and CIA. NY Times intends to report on this information today.

STATUS: Media Relations has notified ODNI, FBI, CIA, and DOD Public Affairs and will respond that NSA has nothing for NY Times on this query.

VR

Greg

Greg Julian Media Relations Chief NSA/CSS Public Affairs Strategic Communications

Media Relations: 🕿 443-634-0721 🏲 969-7499 (secure) - • • • •

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Classified By

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

Dated: 20130930

Declassify On: 20440201

Classification: TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN

Classified By

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

Dated: 20180110

Declassify On: 20440201

Classification: TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN

From: Soule Trumbull D NSA-P3 USA CIV Thursday, February 07, 2019 2:36 PM Julian Gregory S NSA-P212 USA CIV; DL PAOMedia (ALIAS) DN1 Cc: RE: (U) Media Awareness NY Times query regarding MBS communications about Khashoggi
Thursday, February 07, 2019 2:36 PM To: Julian Gregory S NSA-P212 USA CIV; DL PAOMedia (ALIAS) DN1 Cc: RE: (U) Media Awareness NY Times query regarding MBS communications about
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(U/ FOUO) Frumbull D. Soule
NSA Director, Legislative, State and Local Affairs
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From: Julian Gregory S NSA-P212 USA CIV
Sent: Thursday, February 07, 2019 1:51 PM
To: Soule Trumbull D NSA-P3 USA CIV DL PAOMedia (ALIAS) DN1
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Subject: RE: (U) Media Awareness NY Times query regarding MB6 communications about Khashoggi
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Greg Julian
Media Relations Chief
NSA/CSS Public Affairs Strategic Communications
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From: Soule Trumbull D NSA-P3 USA CIV
Sent: Thursday, February 7, 2019 1:43 PM
Sent: Thursday, February 7, 2019 1:43 PM

Subject: (U) Media Awareness NY Times query regarding MBS communications about Khashoggi

Classification: TOP SECRET#SI#NOFORN

(b) (6)

Sir,

BLUF: Media Relations received the attached query from Mark Mazzetti, NY Times, regarding communications from Mohammed bin Salman about Khashoggi.

BACKGROUND: This is the first contact from this reporter on this topic. Media Relations has declined to comment and referred any related queries on this topic to ODNI, FBI and CIA. NY Times intends to report on this information today.

STATUS: Media Relations has notified ODNI, FBI, CIA, and DOD Public Affairs and will respond that NSA has nothing for NY Times on this query.

VR

Greg

D	oc ID: 6671832	
D	Greg Julian Media Relations Chief NSA/CSS Public Affairs Strategic Communications	
	Media Relations: 2 443-634-0721 2 969,7499 (secure)	
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